Open Bid Auctions: A Theoretical and an Experimental Study

For centuries, auctions have been used as an efficient market mechanism for selling or procuring goods. Over time, auctions have evolved from its very basic price call-out form to the much more sophisticated simultaneous multi goods design, the bulk of this dramatic evolution taking place in the later part of the twentieth century. Even though the earliest use of auction dates back to around 500 B.C. in history, proper scientific research aiming at improving the effectiveness or expanding the scope of this versatile market mechanism started around the 1960’s…


Chapter 1. Introduction: Auctions and Experiments
1.1. Progress in the field of Auctions
1.2. Auction Experiments
1.3 Reconciling Theory and Experiment
Chapter 2: An Efficient Multi1unit Auction with Increasing Marginal Values
2.1. Introduction
2.2. A Numerical Example and Some Intuitive Insights
2.3. The General Model
2.4. The Auction Algorithm
2.4.1. Allocation
2.4.2. Prices
2.5. The Numerical Example Revisited
2.6. Multiple Bidders with Complementarities
2.6.1. Single Marginal Bidder Allocation Prices
2.6.2. Multiple Marginal Bidders Allocation Prices
2.7. Linear Programming Approach
2.8. Concluding Remarks
Chapter 3: Price Manipulation by the Auctioneer: An Experimental Study
3.1. Introduction
3.2. Preliminary Theory
3.3. Experimental Idea
3.4. Experiment Design
3.5. Results
3.6. Concluding Remarks
Proof of Theorem 1:
Proof of Theorem 2:
Proof of Theorem 3.1 and 3.2:
Proof of Theorem 4.1 and 4.2:

Author: ghosh, dipan

Source: University of Maryland

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